O7C3MEN1 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 2 3 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 4 23 Cr. 490 (SHS) V. 5 ROBERT MENENDEZ, WAEL HANA, a/k/a "Will Hana," 6 and FRED DAIBES, 7 Defendants. Trial 8 9 New York, N.Y. July 12, 2024 9:45 a.m. 10 11 12 Before: 13 HON. SIDNEY H. STEIN, 14 District Judge 15 -and a Jury-16 APPEARANCES 17 DAMIAN WILLIAMS United States Attorney for the 18 Southern District of New York BY: PAUL M. MONTELEONI 19 DANIEL C. RICHENTHAL ELI J. MARK 20 LARA E. POMERANTZ CATHERINE E. GHOSH 21 Assistant United States Attorneys 22 23 24 25

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1 2 APPEARANCES CONTINUED 3 PAUL HASTINGS LLP 4 Attorneys for Defendant Menendez BY: ADAM FEE 5 AVI WEITZMAN PAUL GROSS 6 RITA FISHMAN 7 8 GIBBONS, P.C. Attorneys for Defendant Hana 9 BY: LAWRENCE S. LUSTBERG ANNE M. COLLART 10 CHRISTINA LaBRUNO ANDREW J. MARINO 11 RICARDO SOLANO, Jr. ELENA CICOGNANI 12 JESSICA L. GUARRACINO 13 CESAR DE CASTRO 14 SETH H. AGATA 15 SHANNON M. McMANUS Attorneys for Defendant Daibes 16 17 Also Present: 18 Emna Zghal, Interpreter (Arabic) Rodina Mikhail, Interpreter (Arabic) 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

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(Trial resumed; jury not present)

The jury is here. Please be seated. THE COURT:

My current intention is not to give the indictment to the jury at the beginning. I don't think that's needed. if they do ask for it, I'll give it to them. So the parties should look at the indictment, and if they think there is any redactions that are needed to take place, you'll let me know. And then I'll rule on that if there is an issue.

(Jury present)

THE COURT: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen of the If you're following along, I'm going to pick up where I left off yesterday, which is at page 36. And if you're not following along, obviously, simply listen.

And this next charge I'm going to give you, you already know because I gave it to you a couple of times during the course of the trial and during the course of the summations. Actually, not during the trial itself, but during summations I gave you the charge.

There are several individuals whose names you have heard during the course of this trial but who did not testify here in front of you. I instruct you that each party had an equal opportunity or lack of opportunity to call any of those witnesses. You should not draw any inferences or reach any conclusions as to what they would have testified to had they Their absence should not affect your judgment in been called.

any way.

You should, however, remember that the law does not impose on a defendant in a criminal case the burden or duty of calling any witness or producing any evidence. You know that; I've told you that several times.

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The defendants have called one or more witnesses who have given an opinion of those defendants' characters or reputations. This testimony is not to be taken by you as the witness's opinion as to whether each defendant is guilty or not guilty. That guestion is for you alone to determine.

You should, however, consider this evidence, together with all the other facts and evidence in this case, in determining whether the defendant you are considering is guilty or not guilty of the charges against that defendant.

Thus, after considering all of the evidence, including testimony about the witness's opinion of that defendant's good character or reputation, you find a reasonable doubt has been created as to a particular charge or charges, you must acquit that defendant of those charge or charges.

On the other hand, after considering all of the evidence, including that of the witness's opinion of that defendant's character or reputation, you're satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant you are considering is guilty, you should not acquit that defendant merely because you believe that witness believes that defendant to be a person of

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good character or to have a good reputation.

Now, the three defendants here did not testify in this case. Under our Constitution, a defendant has no obligation to testify or to present any evidence, because it's the government's burden to prove each defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and that burden remains with the government throughout the entire trial, and never shifts to the defendant. Again, you already know that.

A defendant is never required to prove he is innocent. Therefore, you may not attach any significance to the fact that the three defendants here did not testify in this trial. adverse inference against a defendant may be drawn by you because that defendant did not take the witness stand and testify. You may not consider this against the defendant you are considering in any way in your deliberations.

Some of the people who may have been involved in the schemes alleged in this trial are not on trial. That does not matter. You may not draw any inference, favorable or unfavorable, toward the government or the defendants from the fact that individuals other than these three defendants were not named as defendants in the indictment in this action. may you speculate as to the reasons why other persons are not defendants here before you. Those matters are wholly outside your concern, and have no bearing on your function as jurors.

During this trial, the defendants have contended that

their actions were motivated by considerations that were not unlawful. However, even if true, it is not a defense to any count that the defendant may have been motivated by both proper

requisite intent, even if he possesses a dual intent -- that

and improper motives. A defendant may be found to have the

is, an unlawful intent and also a proper or a neutral intent.

Proof of motive is not a necessary element of the crimes with which the defendants are charged. Proof of motive does not establish guilt nor does the lack of proof of motive establish that a defendant is not guilty. If the guilt of a defendant is shown beyond a reasonable doubt, it is immaterial what that defendant's motive for the crime or crimes may be, or whether any motive be shown. But the presence or absence of motive is a circumstance which you may consider as bearing on the intent of a defendant.

You have heard testimony that one or more of the defendants made or caused others to make certain statements to law enforcement or prosecutorial authorities in which he claimed that his conduct was consistent with innocence and not with guilt. The government claims that these statements in which the defendant attempted to exculpate himself are false.

If you find that a defendant gave a false statement in order to divert suspicion from himself, you may, but are not required to, infer that that defendant believed that he was guilty. You may not, however, infer on the basis of this alone

that the defendant is in fact guilty of the crimes with which he is charged.

Whether or not the evidence as to a defendant's statements shows that the defendant believed he was guilty and the significance, if any, to be attached to any such evidence, are matters for you, the jury, to decide. And you know that also because those are issues of fact.

Now, in this next charge, I've also told you before right now. The question of any possible punishment of the defendant you are considering in the event of conviction is of no concern to you, and should not in any sense enter or influence your deliberations. The duty of imposing any sentence in the event of conviction rests exclusively upon me. That's part of my job. Not yours.

Your function is to weigh the evidence and to determine whether or not each defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based solely on the basis of evidence in this trial. Under your oath as jurors, you cannot allow consideration of the punishment that may be imposed upon the defendant in the event of conviction to influence your verdict in any way or in any sense enter into your deliberations.

Those are my general instructions. Now I'll turn to the indictment itself, and give you first an overview.

The defendants -- Robert Menendez, Wael Hana, and Fred

Daibes -- have been charged in an indictment or also called a

superseding indictment. Remember, the indictment is simply an accusation. It's the means by which a criminal case is started. It is not evidence, it is not proof of the guilt of any defendant, it creates no presumption, and it permits no inference that any defendant is guilty. The law is just the opposite. You know that each defendant is presumed innocent of the crimes charged, unless and until you find the government has proven that defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

You are to give no weight to the fact that an indictment has been returned against each of these defendants. And each of the three defendants here has pled not guilty to the charges in the indictment.

There are 18 counts. Each count charges one or more defendants with a different crime. You must consider each count separately and return a separate verdict of guilty or not guilty for each. Whether you find the defendant or defendants guilty or not guilty as to one offense should not affect your verdict as to any other crimes charged.

I'll now summarize the offenses. And I can tell you that I'm going to give you, I'll give the foreperson the verdict sheet, and this will help you help guide your deliberations. And it's quite straightforward, and it goes count by count, Count One, Count Two, and so forth. And it says what the charged crime is. For example, in Count One it says "conspiracy to commit bribery." And then it will tell you

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which defendants are charged in that count. It's all laid out for you.

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So Count One, the three defendants charged in Count One, conspiracy to commit bribery are Mr. Menendez, Mr. Hana, and Mr. Daibes, and there is a line for each, then it says guilty and not guilty. Guilty or not guilty. When you reach a unanimous verdict on each defendant, you'll check the relevant box, and you go right through to Count 18. And then at the end, after a unanimous verdict has been reached on each of the counts against each of the defendants charged in each of those counts, you'll sign, every juror will sign the verdict form. It helps order your deliberations, if you choose to follow that order.

Now, I've told you what that there are 18 counts.

Count One charges that Mr. Menendez, Mr. Hana, and Mr. Daibes participated in a conspiracy to bribe a public official from approximately 2018 until approximately 2023.

Conspiracy is an agreement by two or more people to take an action or actions that violate the law. When I sav it's in or about 2018 through in or about 2023, this simply means approximately 2018 to approximately 2023.

Count Two charges from at least approximately 2018 through approximately 2023, those three defendants participated in a conspiracy to commit honest services wire fraud.

And later in these instructions I'll go through what

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each of those counts means.

Count Three charges from approximately the same time period, Mr. Menendez participated in a conspiracy to commit extortion under color of official right. Again, I'll later in these instructions tell with you what that crime consists of.

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Count Four charges from approximately the same time period, Mr. Menendez and Mr. Daibes conspired to endeavor, that is, seek, to obstruct justice in connection with the federal criminal prosecution of Mr. Daibes in the District of New Jersev.

Count Five charges in the same time period, Mr. Menendez demanded or accepted or received a bribe as a public official in connection with actions to benefit Mr. Hana and the government of Egypt.

Now, this is a substantive count, not a conspiracy There are two different types in this indictment. Remember, conspiracy is an agreement by at least two people to commit an illegal act. And Count Five is the first of the substantive counts. And I'll explain the difference in a moment, but a conspiracy count is a different count than the substantive count.

Six, Count Six charges in the same time period, Mr. Hana and Mr. Daibes offered or paid a bribe to a public official in connection with actions to benefit Mr. Hana and This is also a substantive crime.

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Count Seven, same time period, charges Menendez, Hana, and Daibes with committing honest services wire fraud in connection with actions to benefit Hana and Egypt.

Count Eight, same time period, charges Menendez committed extortion under color of official right in connections with actions to benefit Hana and Egypt.

Nine, same time period, charges Menendez and Hana committed honest services wire fraud in connection with actions to benefit Jose Uribe and associates of Mr. Uribe.

Count Ten, same time period, charges Mr. Menendez with committing extortion under color of official right in connection with actions to benefit Uribe and his associates.

Count Eleven, same time period, charges Menendez demanded or accepted or received a bribe as a public official in connection with actions to benefit Daibes and to assist Daibes by acting for the benefit of the government of Qatar.

Count Twelve of the indictment charges, same time period, Daibes offered or paid a bribe to a public official in connection with actions to benefit Daibes or to assist him by acting for the benefit of the government of Qatar.

Thirteen, same time period, charges Menendez and

Daibes with committing honest services wire fraud in connection

with actions to benefit Daibes, and to assist Daibes by acting

for the benefit of the government of Qatar.

Count Fourteen charges, same time period, Menendez

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with committing extortion under color of official right in connection with actions to benefit Daibes and to assist Daibes by acting for the benefit of the government of Qatar.

Count Fifteen charges from at least 2018 through in or about 2022, Menendez and Hana participated in a conspiracy to violate the federal statute that makes it unlawful for a public official, here Mr. Menendez, to act as an agent of a foreign principal required to register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act. And during the trial that act has been referred to as FARA. FARA, which is how it's commonly known.

Count Sixteen charges, from the same time period, that Menendez was a public official acting as a foreign agent.

Seventeen charges that from approximately June of 2022 through in or about 2023, Menendez participated in a conspiracy to obstruct justice in connection with a federal investigation here in the Southern District of New York.

Count Eighteen, which is the last count in the indictment, charges from approximately June 2022 through 2023, Menendez sought to obstruct justice in connection with a federal investigation in the Southern District of New York.

Now, I've already told you this, and you can see from the verdict sheet, that you have to consider each count separately, and each defendant who is involved in that count separately, and you have to return a separate verdict of either guilty or not guilty on each count for each defendant. Again,

it's all laid out in the verdict sheet.

Whether you find the defendant you are considering guilty or not guilty as to one offense must not affect your verdict as to any other offense charged or any other defendant.

Now let's turn to the difference between the conspiracy counts and substantive counts.

Counts One, Two, Three, Four, Fifteen and Seventeen charge the defendants with conspiring, that is agreeing together, to commit certain crimes.

The other counts charge what are called substantive crimes, which are the charges underlying the conspiracy.

Remember that conspiracy is simply an agreement to commit a crime. The substantive counts are the crimes that were the objects of the conspiracies.

A conspiracy charge, generally speaking, alleges that two or more people agreed together to accomplish an unlawful objective or objectives. The focus of a conspiracy count is on whether there was an unlawful agreement. There can be no conspiracy unless at least two people reach such an agreement, whether expressed or implied.

So when you're looking at the conspiracy counts, think: Was there an agreement here? If so, what was it?

The substantive count, on the other hand, charges the defendant with the actual or attempted commission, or with aiding and abetting or causing the commission of a crime.

The substantive offense may be committed by one individual, and it doesn't have to involve any agreement or assistance from anyone else. One individual alone can commit a substantive offense. A conspiracy to commit a crime is a completely separate offense from a substantive crime, although the commission of a substantive crime may be an object or a purpose of a conspiracy.

Since the essence of the crime of conspiracy is an agreement or an understanding to commit a crime, it does not matter if the crime, which was the object of the conspiracy, was never committed. In other words, if a conspiracy exists and certain other requirements are met, the conspiracy is punishable as a crime, even if its purpose is never accomplished.

Consequently in a conspiracy charge, there is no need to prove that the crime or crimes that were the objectives of the conspiracy actually were committed.

Do you see that, ladies and gentlemen? The conspiracy is an agreement to commit a crime. That's the crime. So, it doesn't matter whether the crime was actually committed. It will for purposes of the substantive charge, but not for purposes of the conspiracy charge. Because it is the agreement to commit a crime, that's the crime of conspiracy.

To give you a simple example. If two people agree to hold up a liquor store and do something that put the agreement

into motion, they have committed the crime of conspiracy to commit robbery, even if they never rob the liquor store.

By contrast, conviction of a substantive count requires proof that the crime charged actually was committed or attempted, but does not require proof of an agreement.

To take the liquor store example, there can be no substantive crime of robbery unless the liquor store is actually robbed or attempted to be robbed.

Of course, if a defendant both participates in a conspiracy and commits the crime that was the object of the conspiracy, for example, if the defendant agrees with somebody to rob the liquor store and then goes on to commit the robbery, that defendant may be guilty of both the conspiracy and the substantive crime of robbery.

With respect to the substantive counts, you should be aware that there are two ways in which you may find a defendant guilty. The first way is that you may find that defendant either committed, or willfully caused someone else to commit or attempt to commit, the substantive crime charged in the indictment. I'm going to refer to that way as a claim that a defendant is guilty of a crime as what we call a "principal."

The second way is that you may find someone other than the defendant committed the substantive crime at issue, and the defendant aided and abetted the commission of that crime. I'll refer to that as a claim that a defendant is guilty of a crime

as an aider and abettor.

For the sake of convenience, I'll instruct you first with respect to the counts that charge substantive crimes, then I'll instruct you on the conspiracy counts.

And you'll see as we go along, there are certain conspiracy counts that require that an overt act be taken before you can find a defendant guilty of the conspiracy. And there are other conspiracy counts that don't require an overt act. But I'll go through those as we come to them.

Now, first we're going to do the substantive crimes, then we'll do the conspiracy crimes.

Counts Five and Eleven charge receipt of a bribe.

Don't infer anything from the number of the counts. The order that the crimes are charged are of no import to you. It doesn't matter what order they're charged in.

Count Five charges Menendez with demanding, receiving, or accepting a bribe in return for certain official actions to benefit the government of Egypt and to benefit Mr. Hana.

Count Eleven charges Menendez with demanding, receiving, or accepting a bribe in return for certain official actions to benefit Daibes and to assist him by acting for the benefit of the government of Qatar.

The defendant named in Counts Five and Eleven is simply Mr. Menendez. Nobody else.

To establish a violation of demanding, receiving, or

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accepting a bribe for a public official, the government has to prove each of the following four elements beyond a reasonable doubt.

Again, when you go through these, and you can go through the verdict sheet in any order you want, if you want, since the first ones charged are Five and Eleven, you can go to those first on the verdict sheet. That's entirely up to you. As you go through it, you can look at each element and decide amongst yourselves whether the government has proved each of the elements beyond a reasonable doubt. And if the government has, then you check as to that defendant, then you check off quilty. If you unanimously feel that the government hasn't proved one or more of those elements against the defendant you are considering, then you check off not guilty. And if there are varying views within the jury, you'll deliberate until you reach an unanimous verdict. You exchange views. essence of deliberations.

Let's look at those four elements of Counts Five and Eleven.

First, that at the time alleged in the indictment, Mr. Menendez was a public official;

Second, that he directly or indirectly demanded, sought, received, accepted, or agreed to receive something of value, or for another person or entity at Mr. Menendez's direction or for his indirect benefit to receive something of

value;

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Third, that he did so in return for being influenced in the performance or non-performance of an official act; and Fourth, that he acted with corrupt intent.

I'll explain all of those concepts.

Let's turn to the first element. I just told you that the first element that the government has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that Mr. Menendez was a public official. The term "public official" for these counts includes a member of Congress, as well as an officer or employee or person acting for or on behalf of the United States or any department, agency, or branch of government thereof, including the District of Columbia, and any official function under or by authority of any such department, agency, or branch of government.

That's a lot of words, ladies and gentlemen. can cut through it. I instruct you, as a matter of law, that a United States Senator is a public official. All right. That's taken care of. That's my instruction. You don't have to deliberate about that. So the first element is taken care of in your deliberations, because I've instructed you that a United States Senator is a public official. And you know from the evidence here that Mr. Menendez is a United States Senator.

Now let's turn to the second element. The second element is that Mr. Menendez, directly or indirectly, demanded, sought, received, accepted, or agreed to receive something of

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value, or for another person or entity at his direction or for his indirect benefit to receive something of value.

Here the indictment alleges that Menendez, both directly and through his wife Nadine Menendez, and you know that before they were married her name was Nadine Arslanian, demanded, sought, received, accepted, or agreed to accept a thing of value or multiple things of value as alleged in the indictment.

Under the law, seeking or agreeing to receive a bribe is just as much a violation of the statute as actually receiving one. All right? His agreement, if you find there to be one, to receive a bribe or to seek to receive a bribe, is just as much a violation as if he actually received one. law makes no distinction between demanding, seeking, receiving, accepting, or agreeing to receive a bribe.

You need not find that the defendant you are considering did all of these things. If you find that the evidence proves the defendant you are considering did at least one of those things, then the second element is satisfied.

"A thing of value" includes things possessing intrinsic value, whether tangible or intangible, that the person giving or offering or the person demanding or receiving considers to be worth something. It is not necessary that the thing of value be given at all, or if given, that it be given directly to the public official. Rather, it is sufficient that

benefit.

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the defendant you are considering understood or believed that the thing of value was demanded, sought, received, accepted, or agreed to be received by a family member or another person or entity at the public official's direction or with the public official's approval or for that public official's indirect

Now, again remember, ladies and gentlemen, that I've told you always use your common sense here. There are a lot of words there, and I want you to follow the words. But you know what a thing of value is. Here the words, and again, you should follow the words, but it's common sense as to what a thing of value is.

Let's turn to the third element. The third element is that Mr. Menendez engaged in a quid pro quo. There has been a lot of talk about a quid pro quo. The third element is that Mr. Menendez engaged in a quid pro quo transaction in which he, directly or indirectly, demanded, sought, received, accepted, or agreed to receive something of value or for another person or entity at Mr. Menendez's direction or for his indirect benefit to receive something of value, in return for being influenced in the performance or non-performance of an official act.

All right. I'll tell you what an official act is, then I'll tell you what a guid pro guo is.

An official act means any decision or action on any

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action or matter that may at any time be pending or that may by law be brought before any public official in his official capacity or in his place of trust. I've already defined public official.

An official act must involve a decision or action on a specific question or matter. Thus, you must find two distinct requirements are met to find an official act. First, there must be a question or matter pending before a public official; and second, there must be a decision or action on that question or matter.

The question or matter must involve a formal exercise of governmental power that is similar in nature to a lawsuit before a court, a determination before an agency, or a hearing before a committee. The question or matter must be something specific and focused that is pending or may by law be brought before any public official. "May by law be brought" means something within the specific duties of an official's position -- the function conferred by the authority of that official's office. It also means that the question or matter must be something relatively circumscribed and concrete. kind of thing that might be put on an agenda or tracked for progress and checked off as complete. It must be something that may by law be brought before a public official or may at some time be pending before a public official, but not necessarily the official who is alleged to have demanded,

received, or accepted a bribe.

To qualify as an official act, the public official must make a decision or take an action on the applicable question or matter, or agree to do so. The decision or action does not need to be specifically described in any law, rule, or job description to be considered by you to be an official act.

The decision or action may include using one's official position to exert pressure on another official to perform or not perform an official act. It may also include using one's official position to provide advice to another, knowing or intending that such advice will form the basis for an official act by another.

However, not every action taken by a public official qualifies as an official act. Some examples of actions that are not without more official acts are setting up a meeting — these are things that are not official acts — setting up a meeting isn't an official act. Talking with a lobbyist or another official isn't an official act. Organizing an event, expressing support for an action, decision, or idea, without more, those actions by themselves do not constitute a decision on a question or matter and are therefore not official acts.

That is not to say that sort of activity is not relevant. For example, such activity may be evidence of an agreement to take official acts or to advise or pressure another official to take official acts.

What's an official act, ladies and gentlemen? It's for you, because it is a fact issue. You will decide what an official act is in the context of these charges.

Bribery involves an exchange of a thing or things for official action by a public official. In other words, a quid pro quo, which is Latin for this for that or these for those.

I'm going to be using it when I talk to you about the bribery charges, and when I talk to you about the honest services wire fraud charges, and when I talk to you about the extortion charges.

The government has to prove that the defendant you are considering demanded, sought, received, or agreed for a public official to receive a thing of value in exchange for the promise or performance or non-performance of an official act.

To prove a quid pro quo, the government must show both (1) there was a particular question or matter on which the official promised to act in exchange for the thing of value and (2) that the particular question or matter was identified and agreed upon at the time the public official, here Mr. Menendez, accepted or agreed to accept the payment or benefit.

While the government is not required to prove that the particular act of influence was identified at the time the public official accepted or agreed to accept the payment or benefit, it is not sufficient if the government only shows that a public official simply promised to take some or any official

action. The government must prove at a minimum that the public official promised to take official action on a particular question or matter as the opportunity to influence that same question or matter arose.

A quid pro quo must be explicit. It has to be clear and unambiguous. But it does not have to be expressed or stated. If it had to be expressed or stated, the law could be easily frustrated by knowing winks and nods. You know, wink-wink, nod-nod. The solicitation or receipt of a thing of value in return for an official act can be implied from words and actions, so long as you find that the defendant you are considering understood at the time that a thing of value was being sought or given or received in exchange for the promise or agreement of a public official to be influenced in the performance or non-performance of an official act.

It is not necessary that the public official in fact performed or had the actual authority or ability to perform the act which the defendant you are considering promised or sought the public official to perform.

Bribery requires an intent to effect an exchange of money or other thing of value for official action. But each payment may not be correlated with a specific official act.

The requirement that there be payment of a thing of value in return for the agreement to perform an official act is satisfied so long as the evidence shows it is a course of

conduct of things of value flowing to a public official in exchange for official action -- or a pattern of official actions -- on a particular question or matter to be influenced.

In other words, the intended exchange in bribery can be this for these or these for these. It doesn't have to be just this for that. It is not necessary for the government to prove that the public official intended to perform a set number of official acts or any in return for the payments.

Also, because people rarely act for a single purpose, the government is not required to prove that the defendant you are considering acted solely in return for a thing of value. This element can be satisfied, regardless of whether the parties to the exchange had a prior relationship, nor does it matter who initiated the exchange.

Please note that although I'll refer to official acts, this element can be satisfied if the bribe was demanded or sought or received in exchange for influencing the public official to refrain from taking an official act.

Put differently, a quid pro quo can either involve taking an official act that is beneficial to the payor or it can also involve refraining from performing an official act that would be detrimental to the payor.

I'll refer to both as official acts. So you can agree to take an official act and you can agree to refrain from taking an official act.

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Keep in mind that in considering this element, it is whether the defendant you are considering intended for a public official to demand or receive a bribe in return for being influenced in the performance of an official act that is important, not what actually happened later. It is not a defense that the public official would have performed the particular official act without the influence of a thing of value.

In other words, it's not a defense that had there been no bribe, the official might have taken the same action anyway. Or that the acts or promises sought or taken were lawful, desirable, or beneficial to the public.

The defendant you are considering is guilty of demanding or accepting or agreeing to accept a thing of value, even if he would have, for other reasons, taken the same action for which that thing of value was sought, demanded, or received or agreed to be received.

Not every gift or thing of value given to a public official constitutes a bribe. Again, always use your common sense here. Under the law, giving a gift or thing of value to a public official to cultivate friendship or to build goodwill in hopes of ultimately affecting one or more unspecified official acts now or in the future is not federal bribery. For bribery there has to be a quid pro quo, a specific intent to give or receive something of value, in exchange for an official

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act as I've defined for you a few moments ago.

Payments, sometimes referred to as goodwill gifts, made with no more than some generalized hope or expectation of ultimate benefit on the part of the donor, are thus not bribes, since they were made neither with the intent to engage in a relatively specific quid pro quo with an official, nor because of a specified official act. As to each defendant, consider whether that defendant intentionally gave or received the gift as part of an intended exchange for an official act by Mr. Menendez.

Now, let's turn to that fourth element. Again, this is all common sense when you follow these instructions.

Corrupt intent means to act with an improper motive or The defendant must have demanded, sought, received, or agreed to receive a thing of value with the improper motive or purpose of a public official being corruptly influenced in the performance or non-performance of an official act.

This involves conscious wrongdoing or, as it has sometimes been described, a bad state of mind. Although the defendant need not be aware of the specific law that he is charged with violating.

The party demanding or receiving a thing of value may have a different intent from the party giving it or any other party involved in an alleged offense. Therefore, you must

decide the intent of the receiver separately from the intent of the giver or from the intent of other parties involved in the alleged offense. In considering this element, remember that it is the public official's intent to be influenced which is important. Not the public official's subsequent actions, if indeed he took any actions.

It is no defense that the defendant acted because of both proper and improper motives, and the defendant you are considering may have a corrupt intent, even if he possessed both an unlawful intent to seek or receive a bribe, and some other non-criminal intent.

Remember, direct proof of intent is not required. Corrupt intent by an individual may be established by circumstantial evidence of that person's state of mind, including proof of a person's words and conduct and the logical inferences that can be drawn from that proof.

(Continued on next page)

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THE COURT: Now we'll turn to Counts Six and Twelve, which are also substantive counts: Offer or payment of a bribe to a public official.

We've been discussing the charges related to a public official demanding or accepting a bribe, and now I'll turn to the charges related to offering or paying a bribe. You see those were one side of the coin. This is the other side of the coin.

Counts Six and Twelve charge Hana and Daibes with offering or paying bribes to a public official. So you see the difference. Five and Eleven had to do with demanding, receiving or accepting a bribe on the part of a public official. And now Six and Twelve are the other side of the transaction, offering or paying a bribe to a public official.

Count Six alleges that from approximately 2018 through approximately 2023, Hana and Daibes offered and provided bribes to Menendez, who, as you know, was a public official, directly and through Nadine Menendez, in exchange for certain official actions benefiting both the government of Egypt and Hana. That's Six.

Twelve alleges that, during the same time period, Daibes offered and gave bribes to Menendez, directly and through Nadine, in exchange for certain official actions to benefit Daibes and to assist Daibes by acting for the benefit of the government of Qatar.

Charge

In order to establish that Hana and Daibes are guilty of the crime charged in Count Six or that Daibes is guilty of the crime charged in Count Twelve, the government has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt here, too, four elements.

First, that on approximately the dates at issue, the defendant you are considering, offered, promised or gave money or something else of value to or for the benefit of a public official;

Second, that the person who received or benefited from the thing of value was then a public official;

Third, that the defendant did so to influence an official act; and

Fourth, that he acted with corrupt intent.

All right. We'll do the first element.

The first element is that the defendant you are considering offered, promised or gave money or something else of value to a public official or for the benefit of a public official.

The law does not distinguish between offering, promising, giving or agreeing to give a thing of value. The simple offer or promise of a thing of value is just as much a crime as the actual giving of the thing of value. All right? Offering it is just as much a crime and actually giving it.

It's not necessary for the payment to have been made at all, or, if made, that it be made directly to the public

public official's indirect benefit.

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Charge

official, but the evidence must establish that the defendant you are considering understood or believed that the payment or thing of value was offered, promised or given to a family member or another person or entity at the public official's direction or with the public official's approval or for that

The second element the government has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that Mr. Menendez was a public official. And I've already instructed you that, as a matter of law, a United States senator is indeed a public official.

The third element is that the defendant you are considering gave, promised, or offered money or some other thing of value to a public official or, as noted above, to another person or entity at the public official's direction or for the public official's indirect benefit, to influence any official act.

Because I have already instructed you regarding what official act and quid pro quo mean, I'm not going to do so Apply the same instructions that I gave you earlier again. regarding these terms.

And they'll come up again and I'll refer you back to the instruction. These instructions are long enough without my constantly repeating these items. But they're all important.

In considering this element, remember it is the defendant's intent to influence the public official's action, 07cWmen2

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and not the subsequent actions of the public official, that is important. Thus, the government does not have to prove that the public official accepted the bribe or did the act sought. It is not necessary that the public official even had the power or authority to perform the act that the defendant sought. For the same reason, it does not matter that the defendant intended to influence an official act that was lawful, or even desirable or beneficial to the public interest.

The fourth element is that the defendant acted with corrupt intent.

I've already instructed you regarding corrupt intent, and apply those instructions here.

You have been instructed that your verdict, whether it's guilty or not guilty, must be unanimous. Remember I've told you that a couple of times. You have to be unanimous on each count against each defendant, one way or the other.

Count Six alleges that Hana and Daibes committed bribery regarding actions to benefit Hana and Egypt. Here, the defendants contend that the government has alleged that the defendants engaged in two bribery schemes: the first relating to payments to obtain certain benefits for Egypt, including foreign military sales and financing; and the second to protect a business monopoly granted to IS EG Halal. The government contends that the defendants engaged in a single bribery scheme. You cannot convict any of the defendants on these

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counts unless you are unanimous that the government has proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt as to the same alleged bribery scheme.

Charge

For example, if half the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt only that the charged defendants engaged in bribes relating to paying foreign military sales and financing, while the other half of the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt only that they engaged in bribes relating to IS EG Halal, there would be no unanimity as to the theory of criminality, and the jury must find the defendants not quilty.

The government does not have to prove all of these theories of liability for you to return a quilty verdict here. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt on one liability theory is enough. But in order to return a quilty verdict, all of you must agree unanimously that the same theory has been proved.

Now we'll turn to a grouping of other substantive crimes, and this grouping is called honest services wire fraud. It's Counts Seven, Nine and Thirteen. And again, while you're deliberating, if you want to follow this charge, you can just go to Counts Seven, Nine and Thirteen on the verdict sheet.

Seven, Nine and Thirteen charge certain defendants with committing honest services wire fraud.

Seven charges from approximately 2018 to approximately 2023, Menendez, Hana and Daibes participated in a scheme to defraud the public, by paying bribes to Menendez, in exchange

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for Menendez taking or not taking certain actions that deprived the public of the right to have Menendez's honest services in connection with certain actions benefiting the government of Egypt and Hana.

Nine alleges, from approximately that same period, Menendez and Hana participated in a scheme to defraud the public, by paying bribes to Menendez, in exchange for Menendez taking or not taking certain actions that deprived the public of the right of Menendez's honest services in connection with certain actions benefiting an individual named José Uribe and Uribe's associates.

Thirteen alleges, from approximately that same period, Menendez and Daibes participated in a scheme to defraud the public, by paying bribes to Menendez, in exchange for Menendez taking or not taking certain actions that deprived the public of the right of Menendez's honest services in connection with certain actions to benefit Daibes and to assist Daibes by acting for the benefit of Qatar.

Now let's go to the elements.

In order to establish the offense of honest services fraud, the government must prove the following four elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

First, that the defendant you are considering knowingly devised or participated in a scheme to defraud the public of its right to the honest services of Robert Menendez Charge

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as a U.S. senator and/or the chairman or ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee through bribery;

You'll remember, ladies and gentlemen, that during the trial the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was referred to either by the full name or referred to as the SFRC.

Second, that the defendant acted knowingly with an intent to defraud;

Third, the scheme or artifice to defraud involved a material misrepresentation, omission, false statement, false pretense or concealment of fact; and

Fourth, that in advancing, or furthering, or carrying out the scheme to defraud, the defendant transmitted, or caused to be transmitted, any writing, signal or sound by means of an interstate or international wire communication.

The first element of honest services wire fraud is that the defendant knowingly devised or participated in a scheme or artifice to defraud the public of its intangible right to a public official's honest services through a bribery.

A public official owes the duty of honest and faithful service to the public he serves. Public officials owe a fiduciary duty to the public. When a public official seeks or obtains a corrupt payment for himself or a third party in exchange for official action, that official has breached his duty of honest service.

A scheme or artifice is simply a plan to accomplish

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some goal. I'll refer to that as a scheme. It's simply a plan to get to some goal.

A scheme to defraud is any plan, device or course of action to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations or promises reasonably calculated to deceive persons of average prudence.

To prove that a defendant engaged in a scheme to deprive the public of the honest services of a public official through bribery, the government must show a quid pro quo; that is, an agreement to exchange a thing or things of value for official action by a public official.

I previously told you what a quid pro quo is, and the instructions described earlier on quid pro quo apply here. Α defendant can participate in bribery even if he did not initiate the payments, as long as he participated in the scheme knowing that the payment was offered, demanded or made in exchange for influencing or seeking to influence the public official's official actions.

Now, I told you earlier what an official act is. Remember I listed what an official act is, and then I listed certain things that were not official acts, and I told you you decide what an official act is in the context of this case.

The instructions earlier about what an official act is apply here but with one difference. In the bribery counts --

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Five, Six, Eleven and Twelve -- an official act is one performed or caused by a public official, which includes federal official. For the purposes of honest services wire fraud, an official act may also be performed or caused by a nonfederal government official. In all other respects, however, an official act for the purposes of honest services wire fraud is the same as an official act for the purposes of bribery. In particular, just like with bribery, an official act for the purposes of honest services wire fraud may include using one's official position to exert pressure on another to perform or not perform an official act.

So, for example, the use of one's official position to exert pressure on a state or local official to perform an official act is itself official action for the purposes of honest services wire fraud. Similarly, using one's official position to provide advice to a state or local official, knowing or intending that such advice will form the basis for an official act by a state or local official, is official action for the purposes of honest services wire fraud.

The second element of honest services wire fraud is that the defendant participated in the scheme to defraud knowingly and with a specific intent to defraud.

A person acts knowingly if he acts intentionally and voluntarily and not because of ignorance, mistake, accident or carelessness.

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Specific intent to defraud means to act knowingly and with the specific intent to deceive for the purpose of depriving the public of its right to a public official's honest In other words, the deceit may consist of concealing or helping another to conceal the things of value that the public official has solicited or received or the public official's implicit false pretense that he is faithfully performing his official duties, including the duty not to accept payments or things of value in exchange for performing, or promising to perform, an official act.

Direct proof of knowledge and fraudulent intent is almost never available, ladies and gentlemen. It would be a rare case where it could be shown that a person wrote or stated that as of a given time in the past he committed an act with fraudulent intent. That's, again, logical. Common sense tells Such direct proof is not required. The ultimate facts of knowledge and criminal intent, although subjective, may be established by circumstantial evidence, based on someone's outward manifestations, such as his words, his conduct, his acts, and all the surrounding circumstances disclosed by the evidence in this case and the rational or logical inferences that you may draw from them. Circumstantial evidence, if believed, is of no less value than direct You know that, because I've told you that several evidence. times.

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In either case -- that is, in the case of circumstantial evidence and in the case of direct evidence -- the essential elements of the crime must be established beyond a reasonable doubt, and you know that also.

The third element the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the scheme or artifice to defraud involved a material misrepresentation, false statement, false pretense or concealment of fact.

A representation, statement, false pretense, omission or concealment of fact is material if it would naturally tend to lead or is capable of leading a reasonable person to change his conduct or is capable of influencing a decision or action by the public. Put another way, a material fact is one that would be expected to be of concern to a reasonable and prudent person in relying upon the representation or statement in making a decision.

It is not necessary that the government prove that the public official actually made a decision or took any action or suffered any financial or other measurable loss from the alleged scheme. And it is not necessary for the government to prove that the defendants realized any gain from it. It is sufficient for the government to prove that the public did not receive the honest and faithful services of Robert Menendez, as I explained them above.

The fourth and final element that the government must

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establish beyond a reasonable doubt is that interstate or international wire communications were used in furtherance of the scheme to defraud.

Charge

Wire communications include telephone calls, faxes, emails, texts and wire transfers between banks or other financial institutions or companies. The wire communications must pass between two or more states or between a state and the District of Columbia or from outside the United States into the United States or from into the United States -- I'm sorry, or vice versa. Let me do that again: Or from outside the United States into the United States or vice versa.

It's not necessary for the defendant you are considering to directly or personally use any wire facility, or cause any wire, as long as such use is reasonably foreseeable in the execution of the alleged scheme to defraud.

In this regard, it would be sufficient to establish this element of the crime if the evidence justifies a finding that the defendant caused or expected the wires to be used by others, and this does not mean that the defendant himself must have specifically authorized others to use a wire facility. When one does an act with knowledge that the use of the wire will follow in the ordinary course of business or where such use of the wires can reasonably be foreseen, even though not actually intended, then he or she causes the wires to be used.

The use of the wire need not be fraudulent.

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material wired need not contain any fraudulent representation. It doesn't even have to involve any request for money. of the wires, however, must further or assist in carrying out the scheme to defraud.

If you find that the wire communication was reasonably foreseeable and that the interstate wire use charged in the indictment took place, then this element is satisfied even if it was not foreseeable that the wire communication would cross state or national lines.

If you find that wire communications were used in furtherance of the scheme to defraud, you must be unanimous as to at least one of the particular interstate or international wire communications in furtherance of the scheme had occurred.

You've been instructed that your verdict, whether it's quilty or not quilty, must be unanimous.

Count Seven alleges that the defendants committed honest services wire fraud to benefit Hana and Egypt. Just as with Count Six, and I've told you that already, the defendants contend that the government has alleged that the defendants engaged in two bribery schemes: the first relating to payments to obtain certain benefits for Egypt, including foreign military sales and financing; and the second to protect the business monopoly granted to IS EG Halal.

The government contends that the defendants engaged in a single bribery scheme. You cannot convict any of the

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defendants on these counts unless you are unanimous that the government has proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt as to the same alleged bribery scheme. Just as I've told you with Count Six, the government does not have to prove all of these theories of liability in order for you to return a verdict of quilty here. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt on one liability theory is enough to convict, but in order to do so, all of you must agree unanimously that that same theory has been proven.

Now we'll go to another grouping. We're marching through the charge.

This grouping is Counts Eight, Ten and Fourteen, extortion under color of official right. They charge Menendez with obtaining one or more things under the color of official right.

Count Eight relates to the alleged scheme by Menendez to obtain things of value from Hana and Daibes in exchange for certain official actions benefiting the government of Egypt and Hana.

Ten relates to the alleged scheme by Menendez to obtain things of value from Hana and Uribe in exchange for certain official actions benefiting Uribe and his associates.

Fourteen relates to the alleged scheme by Menendez to obtain things of value from Daibes in exchange for certain official actions benefiting Daibes and to assist Daibes by acting for the benefit of the government of Qatar.

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The crime of extortion under color of official right is the use of one's position as a public official, or the authority of public office, to obtain money for oneself, or for another person, knowing the thing of value was made in return for official acts.

In the context of extortion under color of official right, it is the public officer's official power that supplies the necessary element of coercion, and the wrongful use of official power need not be accompanied by actual or threatened force, violence or fear.

Now let's go to the elements of extortion under color of official right.

The government has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt four elements:

First, that Menendez was a public official or held public office during the relevant time period;

Second, that he obtained property for himself or someone else not legitimately due him as a public official;

Third, that the property was given to Menendez or someone else with the consent of the giver in exchange for official action by Menendez and that Menendez knew that the property was given in exchange for official action;

Fourth, that interstate commerce, or an item moving in interstate commerce, was delayed, obstructed or affected in any way or degree.

All right. Let's unpack each of those four. The first one you know by now.

Charge

The first element is that the government has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that, at the relevant time charged,

Menendez was a public official or held public office. That you know.

The second element is that he obtained property for himself or for someone else that was not legitimately owed the public office that he occupied; that is, that it was not legitimately owed to Menendez in his capacity as a United States senator.

The term "property" includes money and tangible or intangible things of value that are capable of being transferred; that is, capable of being given from one person to another.

Here's another example, ladies and gentlemen. You know what property is. This charge has a lot of words, and you should follow them, but you know what property is.

The government does not have to prove that the property was given to Menendez directly or that the property personally benefited Menendez.

Again, it all makes sense.

Let's turn to the third element.

The third element the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is Menendez used the authority of his public

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office to obtain the property for himself or for someone else and that the property was given, at least in part, in exchange for official action by Menendez.

Charge

This element requires the existence of a quid pro quo. I've defined that earlier.

To prove a guid pro guo, the government must prove that Menendez obtained the property to which he was not entitled by virtue of his public office, knowing that it was given in exchange for official acts. The government must also prove that the party giving the payment was motivated, at least in part, by the expectation that, as a result of the payment, Menendez would perform or decline to perform official acts for the benefit of that party and that Menendez was aware of that party's motivation.

Again, as I charged you earlier, it's not necessary that Menendez or the person giving the property state the quid pro quo in express or stated terms. It can be implied from words and actions, because otherwise the law's effect could be frustrated by knowing winks and nods. But a quid pro quo must nonetheless be explicit; that is, it must be clearly and unambiguously made.

This element can be satisfied even if the party giving the payment initiated the quid pro quo and even if that party and Menendez had a friendly prior relationship. If you find either to be the case, however, each is a factor that you

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should consider in deciding whether the party giving the payment and Robert Menendez intended to enter into a quid pro The government's burden is to prove that the promise or performance of official acts was at least a part of the motivation for the other party to give over the payment and at least part of what Menendez understood was motivating the other Thus, if you find that the transfer or acceptance of payment was for entirely different reasons, stemming from friendship or any other innocent reason, then this element will not have been proven.

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Charge

The government does not need to prove that Menendez could or actually did perform any specific official act on behalf of the party giving the property. A public official need not have actual or final authority over the official act sought by a payor as long as the payor reasonably believed that the public official had influence, power or authority over the official act sought by the payor and paid based, at least in part, on that belief. If Robert Menendez did take official action on the part of the payor, it is not a defense if the actions he took were desirable or beneficial or that he would have taken the same action regardless of the receipt of a payment from the other party. The extortion laws, like the bribery and honest services wire fraud laws, are concerned with the manner in which public officials take or agree to take or to seek to cause another to take official action, not with

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whether the official actions are good or bad.

I have mentioned several times that Counts Eight, Ten and Fourteen involve payments in exchange for an official act. I already defined that term for you earlier in connection with Counts Seven, Nine and Thirteen, the honest services wire fraud counts, and it has the same meaning here. That is, like with the honest services wire fraud counts, the official act must involve a nonfederal official, unlike in the bribery counts, which relate only to official acts by federal officials.

The fourth element the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt for Counts Eight, Ten and Fourteen is that a defendant's action or an action that he caused affected or could affect interstate commerce in any way or degree. If you decide that Menendez obtained property under color of official right, you must then decide whether this action did affect, or would have affected, commerce between two or more states or between a state and the District of Columbia.

Commerce between two or more states just means that items are bought and sold by entities located in different states or between a state and the District of Columbia.

If you decide that there was any effect at all on interstate commerce, then that is enough to satisfy this element. The effect can be minimal. For example, if a payment obtained by a defendant traveled or went through interstate commerce, that would be a sufficient effect on interstate

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commerce. Even a potential or subtle effect on commerce will suffice.

You do not have to decide whether the effect on interstate commerce was harmful or beneficial to a particular person or business, or to commerce in general. In addition, a defendant need not have intended or anticipated or even known of an effect on interstate commerce. You can find this element has been satisfied if the effect on interstate commerce would have been a natural consequence of the actions he agreed with others to undertake.

In addition, if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the target of the extortion related to something that moved in interstate or foreign commerce, then this element will have been met.

All right. Now let's go to the last group of substantive instructions.

MR. MONTELEONI: Your Honor, might this be a good time for a morning break?

THE COURT: You're suggesting to me that it is. I can tell.

Let's do it. All right. Ten minutes, ladies and gentlemen. My voice definitely needs the break.

(Jury not present)

Ten minutes. THE COURT:

MR. RICHENTHAL: Two quick things, your Honor.

1	THE COURT: You may be seated in the courtroom.
2	MR. RICHENTHAL: Two quick things, your Honor. We
3	could handle it after a short break if folks want to go to the
4	restroom or something.
5	First, we think the Court may have very modestly
6	misspoken just now on something.
7	THE COURT: All right. Let's deal with it.
8	MR. RICHENTHAL: That's the first, and the second is a
9	separate issue.
10	So on the first, on page 84 of the written charge, the
11	last sentence that is on that page
12	THE COURT: Yes.
13	MR. RICHENTHAL: correctly says, "the official act
14	may involve." I think the Court, at least according to Live
15	Note, said orally "must involve." I think it was just a verbal
16	slip, and again, the written charge is correct, but if I
17	THE COURT: I understand. Let's see.
18	(Discussion off the record)
19	THE COURT: OK. I will go back and tell them.
20	MR. RICHENTHAL: Just to be clear, multiple members of
21	our team also heard "must."
22	THE COURT: That's all right. That's No. 1. I have
23	no objection to that.
24	MR. RICHENTHAL: But the second issue is unrelated to

the specific charge.

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We think, and forgive us if we're wrong, that the Court may have shifted practices with respect to the courtroom for the jury instruction portions of the trial. We understand that during the trial, obviously the courtroom was physically open; people were free to come and go. There may have been prioritization given to family members or people associated with the parties or the media and deliveries, since the courtroom's been so busy. And of course, there's an overflow and a live connection.

We think, just because our paralegals told us -- they may be wrong -- that when jury instructions started, that the CSOs didn't want people reentering the courtroom.

> THE COURT: Yes.

MR. RICHENTHAL: Obviously, the public and the media are here and the overflow room is still working, but that's a shift. We just wanted to make sure we understood that that's, in fact, the Court's shift and make sure that no party has an objection. We think it's fine.

THE COURT: OK. I need to keep the movement of people in the courtroom down during a jury charge so that the jury can focus on me. So the compromise was I had my deputy ask the CSOs to allow anyone to leave who wanted but not to have people come and to make sure that everybody could go to the overflow courtroom, which they have.

Now, if anyone has any objection to that, I'll alter

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Is there any objection to that procedure?

MR. RICHENTHAL: The government has no objection. had a technical problem with a computer. I wanted a paralegal to be able to enter, and my understanding --

THE COURT: Well, I would have thought they would have let them.

MR. RICHENTHAL: Yes, that's the only reason I raised We have no problem. Frankly, it makes sense, but we it. wanted to make sure that the defense has no problem that this change has occurred during the charge.

If you'll stop talking, they'll say they THE COURT: have no problem.

MR. RICHENTHAL: I'm sorry.

THE COURT: OK.

MR. LUSTBERG: No, your Honor. I am familiar with situations where the courtroom doors are locked during these proceedings, so I think this is a perfectly appropriate compromise. We have no objection.

THE COURT: Yes. It wasn't locked. Anyone who was here could leave. It was during the charge itself, but I'll change it right now since there seems to be an issue.

Any problem?

MR de CASTRO: No, Judge.

THE COURT: Mr. Fee.

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1	MR. FEE: Just so that the family members can come in.
2	THE COURT: Oh, yes, family members.
3	MR. FEE: Today was the first time they were actually
4	delayed. I thank the government for raising it.
5	THE COURT: You know what? I'll change my
6	instructions to the CSOs, that people can come and go as they
7	please during the charge.
8	Mr. Fee, I wanted on the record that you had no
9	objection to the way it was set up.
10	MR. FEE: I didn't know it. I'm not going to make an
11	issue out of it. I don't object to it. I appreciate the
12	change.
13	THE COURT: Yes. Sure, we'll do it that way.
14	And at all times the overflow courtroom was available
15	with a live feed.
16	All right.
17	MR. RICHENTHAL: And it still is available today as
18	well.
19	THE COURT: Yes.
20	All right. Thank you.
21	Take a few minutes.
22	(Recess)
23	(Jury present)
24	THE COURT: Please be seated in the courtroom.
25	Ladies and gentlemen, you'll remember that

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Mr. Monteleoni said, your Honor, it may be a good time for a break. Those were his words, but what he meant was, your Honor, we think you made a mistake and we want to tell you about it. And indeed I did.

For those who are following along, on page 84, in the last paragraph, the last sentence says: "That is, like the honest services wire fraud counts, the official act may involve a nonfederal official". I misspoke. I said "must involve a nonfederal official." It's "may," but let me give you that paragraph again just so it's clear.

We're at the bottom of page 84.

I have mentioned several times that Counts Eight, Ten and Fourteen involve payments in exchange for an official act. I already defined that term for you earlier in connection with Counts Seven, Nine and Thirteen, the honest services wire fraud counts, and it has the same meaning here. That is, like with the honest services wire fraud counts, the official act may involve a nonfederal official, unlike in the bribery counts, which relate only to official acts by federal officials.

All right. Now, if you're following along, I'll pick it up at the top of page 86.

Count Eighteen charges Menendez with obstruction of justice. Specifically, it charges that from approximately June 2022 through at least about 2023 -- and you'll note that that time period is slightly different than the time period in the

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other counts -- Menendez wrote checks and letters falsely characterizing the return of bribe money to Hana and Uribe as repayment for loans, and caused the then-counsel to make false statements regarding the bribe money from Hana and Uribe, in an effort to interfere with the federal investigation of Menendez and others here in the Southern District of New York.

This law is designed to prevent a miscarriage of justice resulting from corrupt methods. It is aimed at a variety of means by which the orderly and due process of the administration of justice may be or is endeavored to be impeded, thwarted or corrupted. Success of the endeavor is not an element of the crime. Any corrupt effort, whether successful or not, that is made for the purpose of influencing, obstructing or impeding the due administration of process is condemned.

The due administration of justice refers to the fair, impartial, uncorrupted and unimpeded investigation, prosecution, dispositions or trial of any matter, civil or criminal, in the courts of the United States. It includes every step in a matter or proceeding in the federal courts to assure the just consideration and determination of the rights of parties, whether government or individual. Thus, due administration of justice includes, but is not limited to, a federal grand jury proceeding, a grand jury investigation or a federal civil or criminal trial.

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In order to establish the offense charged in Count Eighteen, the government must prove each of four elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

First, that on or about the dates set forth in the indictment, there was a proceeding pending before a federal court or a grand jury;

Second, that the defendant you are considering -here, this charge is solely against Menendez -- knew of the
proceeding;

Third, that the defendant acted to obstruct or impede, or endeavored to obstruct or impede, the proceeding; and

Fourth, that the defendant acted with corrupt intent.

The first element the government has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that on approximately the dates set forth in the indictment -- and remember, all these dates can be approximate -- there was a proceeding pending before a federal court or grand jury.

The second element is that the defendant knew that such a proceeding was in progress. In order to satisfy this element, you need only determine that Menendez knew on or about the date charged in the indictment that a criminal case or a grand jury proceeding was in progress. In this regard, you may take into account all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the conduct with which Menendez is charged in determining whether he knew that a criminal case or grand jury

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proceeding was in progress.

The third element in regard to obstruction of justice is that the defendant influenced, obstructed or impeded, or endeavored to influence, obstruct or impede, the proceeding.

Endeavor means any effort or any act to obstruct, impede or interfere with the trial or grand jury proceeding. Success of the endeavor is not an element of the crime. The term "endeavor" is designed to reach all conduct which is aimed at influencing, obstructing or impeding the due administration of justice. This element is satisfied if you find that Menendez acted to obstruct, or took action knowing that it had the natural and probable effect of obstructing, the due administration of justice.

The final element is that Menendez must have acted corruptly. The word "corruptly" means simply having the improper motive or purpose of obstructing justice. Obstructing justice need not have been the sole motivation for his conduct as long as he acted, at least in part, with that improper purpose. You may consider all the evidence and surrounding circumstances in determining whether Menendez acted corruptly.

A defendant's actions can qualify as a corrupt attempt to interfere with a judicial or grand jury proceeding only if the defendant specifically intends to interfere with the proceeding. That specific intent requires knowledge by the defendant that his actions are likely to interfere with the

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proceeding. In other words, there must be a nexus between the actions and the proceeding. The prosecution must prove that the defendant engaged in conduct directed at the court or grand jury that he believed would have the natural and probable effect of interfering with a proceeding.

A defendant's interactions with third parties, including prosecutors, are therefore relevant to this charge only if the defendant knew that those interactions were likely to affect the judicial or grand jury proceeding and specifically intended that result. It is not sufficient that the defendant knew of the proceeding's existence, or even that he hoped or thought it possible that his actions could affect the proceeding.

Now let's turn to Sixteen, public official acting as an agent of a foreign principal.

It is a crime for any public official to be or to act as an agent of a foreign principal within the meaning of the Foreign Agents Registration Act, which you know is referred to as FARA. Count Sixteen charges Menendez was a public official who was and acted as an agent of the government of Egypt and certain Egyptian officials from approximately 2018 until approximately 2022.

FARA requires the registration with the Department of Justice of anyone who is or acts as an agent of a foreign principal. However, a public official cannot act as an agent

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of a foreign principal, even though someone who is not a public official can if he or she registers with the Department of Justice.

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All right? People who are not public officials can act as agents of a foreign principal if they register under FARA, but public officials are not allowed to act as an agent of a foreign principal.

In order to establish the offense charged in Count Sixteen, the government must prove three elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

One, that the defendant was a public official;

Two, that he was or acted as an agent of a foreign principal;

Third, he acted knowingly.

The first element is that Menendez was a public official during the relevant time period. A public official includes a U.S. senator. Again, that's rather straightforward.

The second element is that Menendez was or acted as an agent of a foreign principal.

The government of a foreign country, such as Egypt, is a foreign principal. OK? The government of Egypt is a foreign principal. Where the government of a foreign country is the pertinent foreign principal, the term "foreign principal" includes the government's agencies, officials, officers and employees.

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An agent of a foreign principal includes the following:

- (1) any person who acts as an agent, representative, employee or servant, or any person who acts in any other capacity at the order, request, or under the direction or control, of a foreign principal or of a person any of whose activities are directly or indirectly supervised, directed, controlled, financed or subsidized in whole or in major part by a foreign principal and who directly or through any other principal --
- (i) engages within the United States in political activities for or in the interests of such foreign principal;
- (ii) acts within the United States as a political consultant for or in the interests of such foreign principal; or
- (iii) within the United States represents the interests of such foreign principal before any agency or official of the government of the United States; or.
- (2) any person who agrees, consents, assumes or purports to act as, or who is or holds himself out to be, whether or not pursuant to contractual relationship, an agent of a foreign principal.

As you can see, the government does not have to prove that a person engaged in all of the activities I've set forth above for that person to be an agent of a foreign principal.

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Engaging in any one of those activities that I set forth above would suffice to make that person an agent of a foreign principal.

It would be enough, for example, if the government proved that the person engaged within the United States -- at the order, request, direction or control of a foreign principal -- in political activities for or in the interests of the foreign principal, because that is one way that one can be an agent of a foreign principal.

The term "political activities" means any activity that the person engaging in believes will, or that the person intends to, in any way influence any agency or official of the government of the United States or any section of the public within the United States with reference to formulating, adopting or changing the domestic or foreign policies of the United States or with reference to the political or public interests, policies or relations of a government of a foreign country or a foreign political party.

(Continued on next page)

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The term "political consultant" means any THE COURT: person who engages in informing or advising any other person with reference to the domestic or foreign policies of the United States, or the political or public interests, policies, or relations of a foreign country or of a foreign political party.

A person can act as an "agent of a foreign principal" if he acts under the order, direction, or control of a foreign principal or at the request of a foreign principal. The term "request" has a particular meaning here and it's narrower than its meaning in everyday use. Here, not every ask by a foreign principal qualifies as such a request. To qualify as a request, an ask must be something more than an ordinary solicitation, although it can be less than an order or command. So a foreign principal does not make a qualifying request merely by asking or persuading someone else for his own reasons to do something, even if the request, if fulfilled, would benefit the foreign principal. Instead, the foreign principal making the ask must have some degree of authority over the To that end, the ultimate question, including based on a request, is whether it is fair to draw the conclusion that an individual is not acting independently, such as by simply stating or believing his own views, but is instead acting as an agent of the foreign principal.

To decide whether a person is in fact acting as an

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agent of a foreign principal, you must determine whether that person is acting based on his own volition or views or whether he is instead taking direction, or acting at the order, under the control, or in response to a request, as I've already defined it to you, from a foreign principal.

In determining whether this agency test is met, the surrounding circumstances must evince some level of power by the principal over the agent or some sense of obligation on the part of the agent to achieve the principal's request.

Factors that may support an agency relationship Specificity of the foreign principal's instructions or requests, if the instructions or requests are coercive or accompanied by the offer or the promise of compensation, evidence of an ongoing relationship or coordination between the principal and agent, whether the person seeks or receives feedback on his work from the foreign principal, and if the foreign principal's goals do not align with the alleged agent's own interest or subjective viewpoint.

Conversely, the following factors may count against finding an agency relationship: If the foreign principal's instructions or requests are more general, the foreign principal's goals align with the alleged agent's own interests or subjective viewpoint, or the alleged agent's interactions with the foreign principal or its intermediaries are only infrequent.

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You should consider all of the surrounding circumstances to determine whether the defendant acted as an agent to foreign principal.

The third element is that the defendant acted knowingly. The term "knowingly" was earlier defined. It has the same meaning here.

In addition to the substantive offenses that I've just described, the defendants are also charged with separate conspiracies to violate federal laws.

We've discussed the substantive counts and I'm going to revert to the conspiracy counts.

Count One is the conspiracy to bribe a public official. It charges Menendez, Hana, and Daibes with participating in a conspiracy to bribe an public official from at least in or about 2018 through approximately 2023, in violation of 18, United States Code, Section 371. It also charges that certain overt acts were committed in furtherance of the conspiracy.

You know a conspiracy is simply a criminal partnership, a combination or agreement of at least two people to join together to accomplish some unlawful purpose. I've already told you this. Conspiracy simply means agreement.

The crime of conspiracy to violate a federal law is an independent offense, separate and distinct from the commission of the substantive crime. You already know that. Conspiracy

is different than the substantive crime.

If a conspiracy exists, it's punishable as a crime, even if it should fail to achieve its purpose. Consequently, for a defendant to be guilty of conspiracy, there is no need for the government to prove that he or any other conspirator was actually successful in their criminal goals. You may thus find the defendant guilty of the crime of conspiracy, even if you find that the substantive crimes that were the object of the conspiracy were never actually committed.

Each member of a conspiracy may perform separate and individual acts. Some conspirators play major roles, other play minor roles. An equal role is not what the law requires.

When people enter into a conspiracy to accomplish an unlawful end, they become agents and partners of one another in carrying out the conspiracy. Even a single act may be sufficient to draw a defendant within the scope of a conspiracy.

In order to find the defendant you are considering guilty on Count One, which is conspiracy to bribe a public official, the government has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following three elements:

First, that the conspiracy charged in Count One in fact existed. In other words, that from approximately 2018 to approximately 2023, or any portion of that time period, there was an agreement or understanding among two or more people to

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take action that would violate one or more of those provisions of the law which make it illegal to demand or receive a bribe as a public official or to offer or pay a bribe to a public official;

Second, that the defendant you are considering knowingly and willfully became a member of the conspiracy with the intent to further its illegal purpose -- that is, with the intent to achieve the illegal object of the charged conspiracy; and

Third, that any one of the members of the conspiracy knowingly committed at least one overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.

We'll look at the three elements.

First element is that you determine whether or not the conspiracy existed. You already know this. A conspiracy is an agreement by two or more people to take actions that violate the law.

The essence of the crime of conspiracy is an agreement to accomplish an unlawful objective. Again, you know it. It's not necessary that a conspiracy actually succeed in its purpose for you to conclude that it existed or that the defendant actually committed the crime that is the object of the conspiracy. Indeed, you may find the defendants guilty of conspiracy, despite the fact that it was factually impossible for any of the defendants to commit the substantive crime or

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goal of the conspiracy. This is because the success or failure of a conspiracy is not material to the question of the guilt or innocence of the conspirator.

The crime of conspiracy is complete once the unlawful agreement is made and an act is taken in furtherance of that agreement, and the conspiracy is entirely separate and distinct from the substantive crimes that may be the goal of the conspiracy. Again, you already know that.

In order for the government to satisfy this element, you need not find that the alleged members of the conspiracy met together and entered into any express or formal agreement. And you don't need to find that the alleged conspirators stated in words or writing what the scheme was or stated its object or its purpose or stated every precise detail of the scheme or stated the means by which its object or purpose was to be accomplished. But what the government must prove is that there was a mutual understanding, it could have been spoken or it could have been unspoken, between two or more people to cooperate with each other to accomplish an unlawful act.

You may find that the existence of an agreement to disobey or disregard the law has been established by direct However, since conspiracy is by its very nature characterized by secrecy, you may also infer its existence from the circumstances of this case and the conduct of the parties involved.

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In determining whether there has been an unlawful agreement, you may judge acts and conduct of the alleged co-conspirators that are done to carry out an apparent criminal The adage "actions speak louder than words" is applicable here.

In this regard, you may, in determining whether an agreement existed here, consider the actions and statements of all of those you find to be participants as proof that a common design existed on part of the persons charged to act together to accomplish an unlawful purpose.

Often the only evidence of a conspiracy that's available is that of disconnected acts that, when taken together and considered as a whole, evidence of a conspiracy or agreement to secure a particular result as satisfactorily and conclusively as more direct proof such as evidence of an express agreement.

Of course, proof concerning the accomplishment of the object or objects of the conspiracy may be the most persuasive evidence of the existence of the conspiracy itself. But it's not necessary that the conspiracy actually succeed in its purpose in order for you to conclude that the conspiracy existed.

In considering whether a conspiracy existed, you should consider all of the evidence that has been admitted with respect to the conduct and statements of each alleged

co-conspirator, and any inferences that may reasonably be drawn from that conduct and those statements.

It is sufficient to establish the existence of the conspiracy if, after considering all of the relevant evidence, you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the minds of at least two alleged conspirators agreed, as I've explained, to work together in furtherance of one or more of the objects alleged in Count One of the indictment, and then an act was taken to further that agreement. To find that the government has established the existence of the conspiracy alleged in Count One beyond a reasonable doubt, you must unanimously determine that the government has proven that the conspiracy had as its objective or objectives demanding or receiving of a bribe as a public official, or offering or payment of a bribe to a public official or both of those things. Which I'll describe in greater detail in a moment.

In short, you must all agree on one or more objects of the conspiracy, but need not find both objects to find a defendant guilty.

Count One charges that the conspiracy in Count One had two objectives or objects.

One, that a public official would demand or receive a bribe in return for being influenced in the performance of an official act. I've already instructed you on the elements of this substantive crime in connection with my instructions on

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Count Five and Eleven.

Two, offering or giving a bribe to a public official with the intent to influence the performance of any official act.

I've already instructed you on the elements of this substantive crime in connection with my instructions for Counts Six and Twelve.

As I noted, if you find that the conspirators agreed to accomplish either one or both of these two objectives, then the illegal purpose element will be satisfied. But you must be unanimous as to at least one objective.

As I instructed you earlier, you may find a defendant quilty of conspiracy even if you find that the substantive crimes that were the objects of the conspiracy were not actually committed.

In order to satisfy the second element of Count One, the government must prove that the defendant you are considering willfully and knowingly entered into the conspiracy, that is, that he agreed to take part in the conspiracy with knowledge of its purposes and in furtherance of one or more of its objectives as you've unanimously determined those objectives to be in the first element.

An act is done knowingly if it is done purposely and voluntarily, as opposed to mistakenly or accidently. An act is done willfully if it is done with an intention to do something

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that the law forbids, that is, with a bad purpose to disobey the law, although the defendant need not know of the precise law that he or she was violating or that the law was a federal law.

Now as I said earlier, knowledge is a matter of inference from the proven facts. However, you do have before you the evidence of certain acts and conversations alleged to have taken place involving one or more of the defendants or in their presence, and you may consider this evidence in determining whether the government has proven each defendant's knowledge of the unlawful purposes of the conspiracy.

It is not necessary for the government to show that a defendant was fully informed as to all the details of the conspiracy in order for you to infer knowledge on his part.

To have guilty knowledge, a defendant need not have known the full extent of the conspiracy or all of the activities of all of its participants. It is not even necessary for a defendant to know every other member of the conspiracy.

Nor is it necessary that the defendants received any monetary benefit from their participation in the conspiracy or even had a financial stake in the outcome. Although proof of a financial interest in the outcome of a scheme is not essential or determinative, if you find that a defendant had or did not have a financial or other interest, that is a factor you may

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properly consider in determining whether the defendant was a member of the conspiracy.

The duration and extent of each defendant's participation has no bearing on the issue of his guilt. need not have joined the conspiracy at the outset, and he need not have received any benefit in return. A defendant may have joined it for any purpose at any time in its progress, and he will be held responsible for all that was done before he joined, and all that was done during the conspiracy's existence while he was a member, if those acts were reasonably foreseeable and within the scope of that defendant's agreement.

Each member of a conspiracy may perform separate and distinct acts and may perform them at different times. conspirators may play major roles, while others may play minor roles in the conspiracy. One participating in a conspiracy is no less liable because his part is minor or subordinate. equal role or an important role is not what the law requires. Even a single act can be sufficient to make a defendant a participant in an unlawful conspiracy.

A person's mere association with a member of the conspiracy, however, does not make that person a member of the conspiracy, even when that association is coupled with knowledge that a conspiracy is taking place. Mere presence at the scene of a crime, even coupled with knowledge that a crime is taking place, is not sufficient to support a conviction. Ιn Document 583

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other words, knowledge without agreement and participation is not sufficient. What is necessary is that a defendant participate in the conspiracy with knowledge of its unlawful purposes, and with an intent to aid in the accomplishment of its unlawful objectives.

A conspiracy, once formed, is presumed to continue until its objective is accomplished, or until there is some affirmative act of termination by its members. So, too, once a person is found to be a participant in the conspiracy, that person is presumed to continue being a participant in the venture, until a venture is terminated, unless it is shown by some affirmative proof that the person withdrew and disassociated himself from it.

It is not essential that the government prove that a particular conspiracy alleged in the indictment started or ended on any of the specific dates described for that conspiracy. You know that because I've told you that. sufficient if you find that the conspiracy was formed, and that it existed for some time around or within the dates set forth in the indictment. And that's why when I've been giving you dates, I've been saying things like "in or about" or "approximately."

In sum, the government must prove that a defendant, with an understanding of the unlawful nature of the conspiracy, knowingly and intentionally engaged, advised, or assisted in

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the conspiracy for the purpose of furthering an illegal conspiracy. Only through that does a defendant become a knowing and willing participant in the unlawful agreement. That is to say, a conspirator.

Now let's turn to the third element of Count One, the requirement of an overt act.

The last element the government must prove with regard to Count One is that at least one overt act was knowingly committed by at least one of the conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy.

You'll remember, ladies and gentlemen, earlier today I told you some of the conspiracies required an overt act and others didn't. Count One requires an overt act. An overt act is an act that tends to carry out the conspiracy in part, but need not necessarily be the object of the crime or itself wrong or criminal. The purpose of the overt act requirement is just to ensure that the agreement went beyond the mere talking or agreeing stage.

You need not find that all the defendants in this case committed an overt act. It is sufficient if you find that at least one overt act was in fact performed by at least one co-conspirator, whether a defendant or another co-conspirator, to further the conspiracy within the time frame of the conspiracy. Nor is it necessary for the defendant you are considering to commit an overt act in order to be a member of

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the conspiracy.

Bear in mind that the overt act, standing alone, may be entirely lawful. Frequently, however, an apparently innocent act sheds its harmless character if it is a step in carrying out, promoting, aiding, or assisting the conspiratorial scheme. You are therefore instructed that the overt act does not have to be an act which in and of itself is criminal, or constitutes an objective of the conspiracy. must be an act that furthers the object of the conspiracy.

The indictment charges that a number of particular overt acts were committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. It's not necessary for the government to prove that any of the specified overt acts that are set forth in the indictment were in fact committed. Rather, the government can prove any overt act, even if it's not listed in the indictment, provided that the overt act is committed by one of the conspirators and it is done to further the object of the conspiracy.

It is sufficient if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that any one overt act occurred while the conspiracy was still in existence. Nor is it necessary for you to reach unanimous agreement on whether a particular overt act was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. You just need to all agree that at least one overt act was in fact committed.

So that was Count One, the conspiracy to bribe a public official.

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Next relevant conspiracy is Count Four, conspiracy to obstruct justice. I previously discussed Count Eighteen, which charges Menendez with obstructing justice in relation to an investigation of being conducted here in the Southern District of New York.

I'll now discuss two counts related to conspiracies to obstruct justice. First, Count Four. Count Four charges Menendez and Daibes with conspiring, remember conspiracy requires at least two people to agree, so this conspiracy count charges Menendez and Daibes with conspiring to obstruct justice in relation to the federal criminal prosecution of Daibes in the District of New Jersey.

For this count, the government must prove three elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

First, that the conspiracy to obstruct justice charged in Count Four actually existed, in other words, from approximately 2018 through approximately 2023, or any portion of that time, there was an agreement between two or more people to take actions that would violate one or more of those provisions of the law which make it illegal to obstruct justice;

Second, that the defendant you are considering, whether it's Menendez or Daibes, knowingly and willfully became a member of the conspiracy with an intent to further its That is, with the intent to achieve the illegal

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object of the charged conspiracy; and

Third, that any one of the members of the conspiracy knowingly committed at least one overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.

I have just instructed you on these elements in connection with Count One, and those instructions apply here as well. The difference between Counts One and Four is the goal of the conspiracy. As to Count Four, the government charges that the goal of the conspiracy was to obstruct the criminal prosecution of Daibes pending in the District of New Jersey.

I've already told you the elements of the substantive crime of obstruction of justice in connection with my instructions in Count Eighteen, which was the substantive crime of obstruction of justice.

The other count related to conspiracy to obstruct justice is Count Seventeen. So there are two counts that are conspiracies to obstruct justice. One is Count Four, involving Menendez and Daibes, and the other is Count Seventeen. That count charges Menendez with conspiring to obstruct justice in relation to an investigation pending in the Southern District of New York against him.

But this count the government must prove the following three elements:

First, that the conspiracy charged in Count Seventeen existed, that is, from approximately June 2022 through 2023, or O7C3MEN3

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any portion of that time, there was an agreement or understanding among two or more people to take actions that violate one or more of those provisions of the law that make it illegal to obstruct justice;

Second, that Menendez knowingly and willfully became a member of the conspiracy with intent to further its purpose. That is, with the intent to achieve the illegal object of the charged conspiracy; and

Third, that any one of the members of the conspiracy knowingly committed at least one overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.

I earlier instructed you on these elements in connection with Count One. Those instructions apply here.

The difference between this count and the other conspiracy counts is the goal of the charged conspiracy. regard to Count Seventeen, the government charges the goal of the conspiracy was to obstruct an investigation pending in the Southern District of New York. I've instructed you on the elements of the substantive crime of obstruction of justice in connection with Count Eighteen when I went through the substantive counts.

We've previously discussed Count Sixteen of the indictment, which charges Menendez with being a public official acting as the agent of a foreign principal.

Fifteen charges Menendez and Hana with conspiring,

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that is agreeing together, for a public official to act as an agent of a foreign principal from approximately 2018 until approximately 2022.

I've instructed you already in connection with Counts One, Four and Seventeen on the three conspiracy elements that apply to Count Fifteen -- that the charged conspiracy existed; that the defendant you are considering knowingly and willfully became a member of the conspiracy, with intent to further its illegal purpose; and that one of the members had knowingly committed an overt act. Those instructions apply here as well.

As to Count Fifteen, the government charges that the goal of the conspiracy was to have a public official, specifically Menendez, act as an agent of a foreign principal. That is, the government of Egypt and Egyptian officials. already instructed you on the elements of the substantive crime of public official acting as an agent of a foreign principal in connection with my instructions for Count Sixteen.

I'm now going to turn to Count Two, which is another conspiracy count. It charges conspiracy to commit honest services wire fraud. It charges Menendez, Hana, and Daibes with participating in a conspiracy to violate the honest services wire fraud statute, which I've described earlier.

You know that a conspiracy is a kind of criminal partnership, an agreement of two or more people to join together to accomplish an unlawful purpose. In order to

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satisfy its burden of proof with respect to Count Two, the government must establish two elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

First, the existence of the conspiracy charged in Count Two; and

Second, that at some point the defendant you are considering, whether Menendez, Hana, or Daibes, knowingly and willfully became a member of and joined in the conspiracy.

Unlike the conspiracies charged in Counts One, Fifteen and Seventeen, the conspiracy charged in Count Two does not require an overt act.

I previously instructed you in connection with Count
One on the law relevant to determining whether a conspiracy
existed, and whether a defendant became a member of that
conspiracy. Rely on those instructions and apply them to Count
Two, except that the conspiracy charged in Count Two has as its
object honest services wire fraud.

In deciding whether the conspiracy existed, determine whether the conspirators agreed to accomplish that object, that is, honest services wire fraud. I've already instructed you on the elements of the substantive crime of honest services wire fraud in connection with my instructions for Count Seven, Nine and Thirteen.

Now let's go to Count Three, which charges Menendez with participating in a conspiracy to commit extortion under

color of official right, in violation of 18, United States Code, Section 1951.

In order to satisfy its burden of proof on this count, the government must prove two elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

One, that the charged conspiracy existed; and

Two, that Menendez knowingly and intentionally became

a member of the conspiracy with the intent to accomplish its

unlawful purpose.

I've just charged you on these two elements in connection with Count Two. Apply those instructions here. The difference between Count Two and Count Three is the goal of the conspiracy. In Count Three the government charges that the goal of the conspiracy was to commit extortion under color of official right. I've already instructed you on the elements of the substantive crime of extortion, in connection with my instructions for Count Eight, Ten and Fourteen.

As you know, the government charged that a conspiracy existed in Count One, conspiracy to bribe a public official, and Count Two, conspiracy to commit honest services wire fraud. The defendants contend that the government's proof fails to show the existence of only one overall conspiracy in each of Counts One and Two. The defendants claim instead that the government's proof only supports allegations of different, separate and independent conspiracies with various groups of

members in each of those counts.

Whether there existed a single unlawful agreement in each of those counts, or many such agreements, or indeed, no agreement at all, is a question of fact for you, the jury, to determine in accordance with these instructions.

When two or more people join together to form one common unlawful design or purpose, a single conspiracy exists. By way of contrast, multiple conspiracies exist when there are separate unlawful agreements to achieve distinct purposes.

Proof of several separate and independent conspiracies is not proof of a single, overall conspiracy charged in each of Counts One and Two, unless one of the conspiracies proved happens to be the single conspiracy described in the count you are considering.

A single conspiracy does not become multiple conspiracies, however, merely because it may involve two or more phases or spheres of operations, so long as there is sufficient proof of mutual dependence and assistance. You may find that there was a single conspiracy in the count you are considering despite the fact that there were changes in either personnel, or activities, or both, so long as you find that some of the co-conspirators continued to act for the duration of the conspiracy for the purposes charged in the count you are considering. The fact that the members of a conspiracy are not always identical does not necessarily imply that separate

conspiracies exist. In addition, if you find a master conspiracy that includes certain sub-schemes, that does not necessarily constitute a finding of multiple unrelated conspiracies.

In determining whether a series of events constitutes a single conspiracy or a separate and unrelated conspiracy or conspiracies, you should consider whether there is a common goal or goals among the alleged conspirators, whether there existed common or similar methods, whether and to what extent alleged participants overlapped in their various dealings, whether and to what extent the activities of the alleged conspirators were related and interdependent, how helpful each conspirator's contributions were to the goal of others, and whether the scheme contemplated a constituting objective that could not be achieved without the ongoing consideration of the conspirators.

The participants' goals need not coincide exactly for a single conspiracy to exist, so long as their goals are not at cross purposes, and co-conspirators need not agree on all of the details of conspiracy, where the essential of the plan is agreed upon.

On the other hand, if you find that the specific single conspiracy charged in the count you are considering did not exist, you cannot find any defendant guilty of that conspiracy. This is so even if you find that some conspiracy,

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other than the one charged in the count you are considering, existed, even though the purposes of both conspiracies may have been the same and even though there may have been some overlap in membership.

Similarly, if you find that a particular defendant was a member of another conspiracy, and not the ones charged in the count you are considering, then you must acquit that defendant of the conspiracy charges for the applicable count or counts.

Therefore, what you must do is determine whether the conspiracies charged in Counts One and Two in fact existed. If they did, then you must determine the nature of the conspiracy and who its members were.

With respect to Counts One, Two, Six, Seven, Twelve, and Thirteen, if you find defendant Fred Daibes guilty of one or more of those counts, you must then determine for each those counts on which you find Daibes guilty whether he was released on bail in a federal case at the time of the offense. For those counts, the verdict form has a separate line for you to answer this guestion, and you'll see it there.

I want to return to the two ways the defendant can commit a substantive crime, which I talked about at the beginning of these charges, he can commit a crime: First, as a principal, which includes both committing or willfully causing someone else to commit the crime. He can also commit a crime as an aider and abettor.

With respect to Counts Five through Fourteen, Sixteen and Eighteen, which charge the substantive offenses of bribery, honest services wire fraud, extortion under color of official right, obstruction, and a public official acting as a foreign agent, the defendants charged in those counts are also charged with having aided and abetted or willfully caused another person to commit each of those offenses. These are two different, alternative ways of committing a crime, and you don't have to consider whether a defendant did this if you find that he is guilty himself of committing the crime you are considering.

I'll take each of these concepts, that is, aiding and abetting, and willfully causing a crime, those are different concepts, in turn.

So let's look first at aiding and abetting. The aiding and abetting statute provides, in relevant part that:

Whoever commits an offense or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal. What that means, ladies and gentlemen, is that even if the defendant you are considering did not himself commit the offense, the government may meet its burden of proof by proving that another person actually committed the offense with which the defendant is charged; and proving that the defendant aided or abetted, that is, helped, that person in the commission of the offense. A person who aids or abets someone else to commit

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an offense is just as quilty of that offense as if he committed the offense himself. Accordingly, you may find a defendant quilty of the substantive crime if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the government has proven that another person committed the crime, and that the defendant you are considering aided and abetted that person in the commission of the offense.

Again, that's a lot of words, but it's all very logical, it seems to me.

In order to prove a defendant quilty as an aider and abettor, the government has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt:

First, that one or more other persons committed the charged offense, that is, all of the elements of the particular crime were committed or caused to be committed by someone or multiple people;

Second, that the defendant, knowing that such a crime was being committed, intentionally associated himself with that crime; and

Third, that the defendant intentionally took some action to help the crime succeed.

To act intentionally means to act deliberately and purposefully, rather than by mistake, accident, mere negligence, or some other innocent reason.

Please note, however, that the mere presence of the defendant where a crime is being committed, even coupled with knowledge by the defendant that a crime is being committed, or

merely associating with others who were committing a crime is not sufficient to establish aiding and abetting. One who has no knowledge that a crime is being committed or is about to be committed, but who inadvertently does something that aids in the commission of the crime, is not an aider and abettor. And again, that's all very logical.

An aider and abettor must know that the crime is being committed and act in a way that intended to bring about the success of the criminal venture.

To determine whether the defendant aided or abetted the commission of the crime with which that defendant is charged, ask yourself these questions: Did the defendant participate in the crime charged as something he wished to bring about? Did he associate himself with the criminal venture knowingly and willfully? Did he seek by his actions to make the criminal venture succeed?

If he did, then he's an aider and abettor and guilty of the offense. If he did not, then he's not an aider and abettor.

So I described to you what an aider and abettor is and what aiding and abetting a crime means. Now we'll turn to what willfully causing a crime means.

Federal law provides that whoever willfully causes an act to be done which, if directly performed by him, would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a

principal.

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What does the term "willfully cause" mean? not mean that the defendant need have physically or personally committed the crime or supervised or participated in the actual criminal conduct charged in the indictment. The meaning of the term "willfully caused" can be found in the answers to the following questions: Did the defendant intend the crime to occur? Did he intentionally cause someone else or other people to engage in the conduct constituting the crime?

If you are persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the answer to both of those questions is yes, then the defendant you are considering is quilty of the crime charged, just as if he himself had actually committed it.

To prove the defendant guilty in this way, the government need not prove that he acted through a quilty person, that is, the defendant can be found liable even if he acted through someone totally innocent and had no knowledge of the crimes charged in the indictment.

Now let's turn to venue, and you've heard some discussion in the summations about venue.

In addition to the foregoing elements of the offenses, you must consider whether an essential part of each of the crimes charged, or as to each of the conspiracy counts any act in furtherance of the crimes charged, reasonably foreseeable occurred within the Southern District of New York.

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The Southern District of New York includes Manhattan, the Bronx, Westchester, Rockland, Putnam, Sullivan, and Orange Counties, the waterways surrounding these counties, including the East River, the Hudson River, and the Kill Van Kull strait, and all of the bridges that traverse those waterways, including Verrazzano-Narrows Bridge which traverses the Narrows Strait, the body of water separating Staten Island and Brooklyn; the Bayonne Bridge, which traverses the Kill Van Kull strait, the body of water separating Staten Island and Bayonne, New Jersey; and the Goethals Bridge and the Outerbridge Crossing, both of which traverse the Arthur kill strait, the body of water separating Staten Island and Union and Middlesex Counties in New Jersey.

I should note on this issue -- and the issue of venue alone -- the government does not have to prove venue beyond a reasonable doubt. The burden on the government is a lower The government has the burden of proving venue simply burden. by a preponderance of the evidence. A preponderance of the evidence means that the government must prove that it is more likely than not that an essential part of the element or any act in furtherance of the conspiracy you are considering reasonably foreseeable occurred in the Southern District of New Thus, with regard to each count, the government has York. satisfied its venue obligation if you conclude that it is more likely than not that such a part of the crime charged, or any

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act in furtherance of the conspiracy charged, reasonably foreseeable occurred within the Southern District of New York. The government does not have to prove that the complete crime was committed within the Southern District of New York, or that the defendants were ever actually in the Southern District of New York.

You have to look at venue separately for each count. Venue on one count does not establish venue on another count. Although, if applicable, you may rely on the same evidence to establish venue on any number of counts.

With respect to the conspiracy offenses, it is sufficient to establish venue if the government proves that any act in furtherance of the conspiracy charged reasonably foreseeable occurred in the Southern District of New York. act itself need not be a criminal act. It could include, for example, meeting with others involved in the criminal scheme within this district, so long as it is in furtherance of the conspiracy. The act need not be taken by a defendant or a conspirator, as long as the act was caused by the conduct of the defendant or conspirator, and was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant you are considering.

With respect to the substantive counts resting on a bribe being demanded, sought, received, accepted, or agreed to be received or accepted, Counts Five and Eleven, it is sufficient to establish venue if you find that the demanding,

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seeking, receiving, accepting, or agreeing to receive or accept anything of value occurred in the Southern District of New York, including acts that were part and parcel of this conduct.

With respect to the substantive counts resting on a bribe being offered, given, or promised, Counts Six and Twelve, it is sufficient to establish venue if you find that the offering, giving, or promising of anything of value occurred in the Southern District of New York, including acts that were part and parcel of this conduct.

With respect to the substantive offenses of honest services wire fraud, Count Seven, Nine, and Thirteen, it is sufficient to establish venue if you find that any of the wire communications you found to satisfy the fourth element of the offense, use of interstate or international wires, were transmitted from or to the Southern District of New York, so long as the defendant reasonably anticipated that a wire communication in furtherance of the scheme would be transmitted from or to the Southern District of New York.

With respect to the substantive extortion counts, Counts Eight, Ten, and Fourteen, it is sufficient to establish venue if you find that interstate commerce was affected in this district as I've defined affect on interstate commerce above, or if you find that acts of extortion took place in this district.

In addition, if you find a defendant guilty of any of

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the substantive offenses on an aiding and abetting theory, you don't have to consider venue with respect to that defendant, as long as the government has established venue with respect to the person whom the person aided and abetted.

Finally, with respect to the obstruction of justice offenses, Counts Four, Eighteen, and Seventeen, venue exists in the district to which the official proceeding, whether or not pending are about to be instituted, was intended to be affected or in the district to which the conduct constituted in the alleged offense occurred. An official proceeding includes a federal grand jury.

As I said, unlike the elements of the offenses that I have just discussed at length, each of which must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the government is required to prove venue simply by a preponderance of the evidence, which is a lower standard of proof than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The government need only prove venue in one of the applicable ways that I have described above for each count.

If you find that the government failed to prove venue as to the defendant you are considering by a preponderance of the evidence as to any count, you must return a verdict of not quilty as to that defendant on that count.

Now, you know, because I've told you several times, that the indictment alleges certain acts occurred on or about a specific date or time or involved specific amounts. We haven't

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talked about the amounts, but we've talked about dates and times. It doesn't matter, ladies and gentlemen, if the evidence you heard at trial indicates that a particular act occurred on a different date or time or involved a different amount. The law requires only a substantial similarity between the dates, times, and amounts alleged in the indictment and the dates, times, and amounts that you find to have been established by the evidence.

In addition, you must consider each count of the indictment and each defendant's involvement in that count separately, and you must return a separate verdict on each defendant for each count in which he is charged. And you know that. I've already told you.

Again, you go through the verdict sheet however you want. You can go through it in the order of the counts set forth in these charges, or just One, Two, Three, or however you want. It may be easiest to go through it in the charges, but that's entirely up to you.

In reaching your verdict, ladies and gentlemen, bear in mind that guilt is personal and individual. Your verdict that a defendant is guilty or not guilty must be based solely upon the evidence about each defendant. The case against each defendant on each count stands or falls upon the proof or lack of proof against that defendant alone, and your verdict as to any defendant on any single count should not control your

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decision as to any other defendant or any other count. No other considerations are proper.

Let me give you some final directions on how you are to arrive at your verdict. The evidence presented has raised factual issues that you must decide as the triers of the fact, and you must decide those issues, resolve those issues, solely on the basis of the evidence you have heard or the lack of evidence, and these instructions on the law.

Your sworn duty as jurors is to determine whether each defendant is guilty or not guilty, solely on the basis of the evidence or lack of evidence and these instructions on the law.

You must not be influenced by sympathy, or by any assumption, conjecture or inference stemming from personal feelings, the nature of the charges, or your view of the relative seriousness or lack of seriousness of the alleged crimes.

I caution you, ladies and gentlemen, that under your oath as jurors, you are not to consider the punishment that may be imposed upon any defendant in the event of conviction. I've told you that already. The duty of imposing a sentence in the event of conviction rests exclusively on me, the Court. Your function -- and you know this -- is to weigh the evidence and to determine the guilt or non-guilt of each defendant solely on the basis of the evidence and the law which I have given you, and which you must apply to the facts as you find them.

Each of you is entitled to your own opinion, but you are required to exchange your views with your fellow jurors. This is the essence of jury deliberations.

You know, before I told you not to discuss the evidence. Well now, it's your duty to discuss the evidence. If you have a point of view, and after reasoning with other jurors it appears that your own judgment is open to question, then of course you should not hesitate in yielding your original point of view, if you are convinced that the opposite point of view is really one that satisfies your judgment and your conscience.

However, you are not to give up a point of view that you conscientiously believe in, simply because you may be outnumbered or outweighed. Vote with the others only if you are convinced on the evidence and the facts and the law that that's the correct way to decide the case.

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THE COURT: Just a moment, ladies and gentlemen.

Ladies and gentlemen, you've seen we've made a record of these proceedings; you've seen the reporters here. If you wish at any time to have any part of the testimony read back, have the foreperson send me a note and just say what you want read back.

Now, just keep in mind a couple of things. Be as specific as you can be, because we have to find the area you're looking for, the lawyers have to agree on it, with the Court, as to what we're going to send back. So be as specific as you can.

Also, if you ask for all of the testimony of person X and that person was on the stand for three days, it may take three days to read it back. It won't, actually, because we don't read the objections and so forth, but it will take a considerable period of time. We're prepared to do that. I'm just alerting you to the fact that it will take time to read anything back. But you certainly can ask. You have that right, and we'll be pleased to respond to any questions you have.

Now, I've already told you that we have a computer that's been loaded with all the exhibits so you'll be able to call up any of the exhibits, except the actual materials. If you want to see those, the cash or the gold or the jewelry, you'll have to come back into the courtroom. I'm not telling

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you you should do that or have to do it. I'm just telling you it's a service we have available and the exhibits will be available to you in the courtroom.

You can send me any notes you want, or any questions, for that matter, but they have to be in writing, signed by the foreperson, dated and timed. You'd say, your Honor, we'd like the testimony of Mr. X in this regard or Ms. Y, whatever you want. But whenever you send me notes, do not give me any indication of your vote. I don't want any indication of partial votes or anything like that. And the foreperson should sign any notes.

Now, it's my normal custom to appoint juror No. 1 as the foreperson.

Juror No. 1, I'm doing that provisionally. If for any reason you don't wish to serve as foreperson, just let your fellow jurors know that when you go back in, and then the jury will select another foreperson. I don't want any disputes or anything like that. If there's any difficulty in choosing another foreperson, you'll let me know and I'll choose a foreperson. But in the normal course, you would be the foreperson, juror No. 1. Again, if you don't want to, just let your colleagues know that.

Now, at the end of the process, after you've completed the verdict sheet, what you should do is the foreperson will have an envelope, everybody signs it, you put the verdict sheet

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in an envelope and you send a note to say, your Honor, the jury has a verdict, without telling me what the verdict is. And then we'll assemble everybody in open court. The verdict must be taken in a rather formal proceeding in open court. So don't tell me. Keep the envelope sealed and keep the verdict sheet, the completed verdict sheet, in the envelope and come out into court. And I'll guide everyone through the process of taking the verdict.

The verdict must be announced only in open court at the end of your deliberations. And you must be unanimous. It must be a unanimous verdict of all of you.

Only 12 of you, the first 12 jurors, will be deliberating. The five jurors in the back will not be deliberating. However, I am not going to be excusing the five jurors in the back, for reasons that I'll explain to the five jurors in the back at a later time. But what's important now -- and the reason you saw that I stepped to the side -- normally, I would say start deliberating. I'm informed by my deputy that the jury would like to remain together, all of you, for lunch. And that's perfectly fine, except you can't start deliberating now because there are going to be 17 of you there.

So it's a little unusual, but I'm not sending you off to deliberate now. It's 1 o'clock. You'll go into the jury room, enjoy your lunch. Do not discuss this case for the next hour. OK? Do not exchange views. Talk about whatever you

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like, but don't deliberate. Don't discuss the case. Enjoy the lunch.

At 2 o'clock, I'll bring you back here. There will be a marshal, I'll swear the marshal in, and I'll have you start your deliberations at 2 o'clock. All right? And I'll talk to the five people in the back.

Enjoy the lunch. Don't deliberate. I'll see you here in an hour.

(Jury not present)

THE COURT: You may be seated in the courtroom.

Have the parties discussed whether or not the indictment needs any redactions, in the event they ask for an indictment?

MR. FEE: We haven't discussed it, your Honor, but I think it's evident it will be redacted. I think we agree on that subject.

THE COURT: All right. Go ahead and do it.

MR. RICHENTHAL: We prepared a potential redacted version, excising certain matters that the Court had ruled were part of the speech and debate clause. We'll provide that to the defense, and hopefully the parties can confer and agree on a redacted version.

THE COURT: Yes. I don't think it should be difficult.

All right. Thank you.

MR. RICHENTHAL: And in addition, let me note the laptop is available. It has been inspected by all defense counsel. It's being provided by our paralegals, so that's ready to go.

THE COURT: Don't put it into the jury room yet.

MR. RICHENTHAL: No. No, it's not. I just wanted to put on the record that all the defense counsel have had the opportunity to inspect it.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. RICHENTHAL: The final thing, and it's probably immaterial, but in the list of counties that are in the Southern District of New York, the written charge is correct and includes Dutchess County. I think the Court didn't say Dutchess County. I do not think it matters. I'm just noting it.

MR. FEE: Objection, your Honor.

MR. RICHENTHAL: I'm not aware of anything that happened in Dutchess County. I don't think the Court needs to direct anything. I'm just letting you know.

THE COURT: Does any party want me to correct that, to add Dutchess County?

MR. FEE: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. I learned a lot about the waterways when I was reading it.

Are there any exceptions that wish to be taken to the

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## AFTERNOON SESSION

2:00 p.m.

(Jury present)

THE COURT: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.

You may be seated in the courtroom.

I now am going to have the jury commence deliberations, but first we need to swear the marshal in.

Marshal, please come forward. My deputy will address you.

(Marshal sworn)

THE COURT: Thank you.

Ladies and gentlemen, you know I've been telling you not to deliberate. Now I'm going to direct you to deliberate. You each have a copy of the charge. My deputy will hand you a copy of the verdict sheet. Pardon me. The marshal has it. And you will find that the computer has been loaded with all of the exhibits. You also will have paper and pencils or pens.

We're here as long as you want. In the normal course we would end at 5 o'clock. If you wanted to stay later, just let me know in a note from the jury, but assuming I don't hear anything from you, I'll bring you in and have you end your deliberations for the day and come back on Monday. It's entirely up to you as to when you leave.

As I said, you must exchange your views now. When you go home in the evening, again, don't discuss the case with

anyone. Don't do any research or Google or anything or read any publicity or anything along those lines.

Ladies and gentlemen, if the first two rows of jurors will rise, the first 12 jurors, I now instruct you to commence your deliberations. Thank you.

(At 2:10 p.m., the jury retired to deliberate)
THE COURT: You may be seated in the courtroom.

Jurors 13 and up, I want to thank you for being here over these nine weeks. It's a great public service that you have undertaken, and I and my staff and the parties, the lawyers, genuinely appreciate it.

I don't want you to think that your service has been for naught -- for at least two reasons. One is that I assure you that the lawyers here were watching all of the jurors, yourselves included, because they try to determine what the jurors are thinking, and they were watching you throughout. Your aspect, I'm sure, has given them information to interpret however they want.

But more important, or as important, I'm not going to discharge you now, and the reason for that is there are occasions when one of the sitting 12 jurors has to be excused, for one reason or another. And in that event, I will need to call on one of you to take the place of that juror. Now, it's not that usual; that is, that a juror is excused. It's not that usual, but it does happen. In fact, it occurred this

morning in this courthouse in another trial here, where a sitting juror had to be excused and one of the -- I'll call you alternate jurors. It's not technically true, but the alternate juror had to be called back.

I can't do that if I discharge you. So I'm not going to discharge you now. You still will technically be serving as jurors. But I can tell you you don't have to come back here in the morning or go to the jury clerk or anything like that. You should go about your lives. OK?

I am going on to direct you, because there is a possibility that one or more of you may have to be seated as jurors, to continue the rules I set forth earlier; that is, don't discuss this case with anyone else. Don't discuss it amongst the five of you or with your family members or anyone else. Keep an open mind. Don't listen to any of the publicity or social media or anything of that nature.

If you want, you can ask my deputy to notify you when a verdict is reached, and then you'll know there's no possibility that you'll be asked to come back. You don't have to do that, but I guess the main thing is you should go about your lives. You don't need to report here or do anything here.

Is that clear? Any questions?

I genuinely thank all five of you. It's been two months, and it's a great service. Thank you again. I can't discharge you, but you can go about your business.

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Thank you. My deputy will show you out.

(Alternate jurors not present)

THE COURT: The lawyers should stay close. I do find that in the first 15 or 20 minute, quite frequently, the jurors, as they get settled, will send a note out asking for this or that. In any event, make sure my deputy knows how to reach you, and I want everybody to stay relatively close to the courthouse in case you need to come back.

All right. Thank you very much.

(Recess pending verdict)

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Deliberations

(In open court; jury not present)

THE COURT: We have a jury note from earlier. labeled Court Exhibit No. 1 at 2:25 p.m.

"We need a display port cable to connect the laptop to the TV screen." And the parties provided that. This note was given to the parties by my deputy. The parties provided that.

It's 5 o'clock. We'll let the jury go home now. just going to have them line up in front of me, we'll discharge them. Bring the jury in, please.

I'm told they need time to do something. So be Five minutes. I guess they're getting their stuff seated. together.

I'm going to step off the bench. You don't need to rise.

(Pause)

(Jury present)

THE COURT: Good evening, ladies and gentlemen of the jury. I'm told you wish to leave. It's 5 o'clock.

My instructions are the same. Do not discuss this case with anyone else. Don't do any research. Don't watch any social media or any news reports about it over the weekend.

We'll see you at 9:30 on Monday. We cannot begin until all 12 of you are here, and don't begin deliberating until I see all 12 of you are here, you're brought out by the marshal, I see that you're here, and then I'll tell you to

Deliberations

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commence deliberating again. Okay. Until then, don't deliberate in small groups or anything, and don't discuss the case with anyone else. Don't do any research. Enjoy the weekend. We'll see you at 9:30 on Monday. (Jury excused) THE COURT: I'll see everyone on Monday. Enjoy the weekend. (Adjourned until July 15, 2024, at 9:30 a.m.)